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Abstract. The possibility for market participants to simultaneously
place their bids in different markets across an interconnection is
investigated in this paper. Transaction schedulers settle multilateral
transactions among participants, while a central entity coordinates the
overall operation through interactions with the transaction schedulers.
Two issues are dealt with in this context. First, the market participants
are allowed to place their bids simultaneously in more than one
transactions scheduler’s market, and, second, the available transmis-
sion capacity is fairly shared among the transaction schedulers. Eco-
nomically interesting transactions are favored, while confidentiality
of market data and independence of transaction schedulers’ clearing
mechanisms are preserved. The corresponding iterative algorithm is
illustrated in detail on a 15-bus as well as the IEEE-RTS system.
Keywords: Electricity market, market clearing, congestion man-
agement, market coupling, overlapping markets.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Existing situation
In modern power systems, several areas, controlled by
separate entities, form altogether larger interconnections inside
which electricity is traded [1]. In Europe, for instance, the
areas correspond to countries and the entities to Transmission
System Operators (TSOs). While a lot of research effort has
been devoted to improving electricity markets inside areas,
comparatively less attention has been paid to organizational
structures and algorithms allowing separate areas to be oper-
ated in a seamless way in terms of inter-area electricity trade.
Long-term forward contracts between different areas have
been in practice even before the liberalization process. This
paper, however, focuses on the operation of spot markets, from
day-ahead up to real-time, and the development of algorithms
to facilitate the inter-area trade.
A typical way to do so has been the posting by TSOs
of Available Transfer Capacity (ATC) values for importing
and/or exporting at each interconnection and the selling of
consistent transmission rights to the market actors. This is
referred to as explicit auction of transmission capacity, since
the latter is auctioned and sold separately from energy. In
such a framework, for instance, a broker purchases export
and import rights from the areas where the generator and the
consumer respectively are located, in this way settling an inter-
area transaction. Explicit auction is currently the prevailing
allocation mechanism of scarce interconnection resources in
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Europe. Although attractive in theory, this approach has been
found in practice to yield some inefficient use of the network.
The main reasons are: it is difficult for the participants to
anticipate what the value of each transmission line will be for
them, some participants tend to hoard capacity that they don’t
finally use, and pancaking of allocations appears when several
borders are involved in a transaction [2].
The alternative, increasingly used in the last years, is
implicit auction for congestion management, where the use
of the transmission system is allocated implicitly at the time
the energy market is cleared [3]. This is the main way intra-
area congestion management is treated in some parts of North
America, with the several pool based Locational Marginal
Pricing (LMP) approaches [4]. Another implicit auction ap-
proach, called market splitting, has been used for years in
the Nordic market (Scandinavian countries) where in case of
congestion the market is split in two or more price areas [5].
It seems that implicit auction is the future (and already
the present in some cases) way of managing cross-border
transmission capacities in Europe. The prevailing mechanism
for doing so is the so-called market coupling. Both the LMP
and the market splitting approaches require a centralized
market operator that combines the bids in a market clearing
procedure. On the other hand, market coupling is an implicit
auction similar to market splitting but performed in reverse
order. First, each sub-market is cleared; then, these markets are
coupled. It is thus a method performing coordination among
different markets, each using its own rules inside its area [6].
The first implementation of this approach was the Trilateral
Market Coupling (TLC) in operation since 2006 between
France, Belgium and the Netherlands. It is organized as a
decentralized, multilateral contractual arrangement between
the following participants [3]. The Power Exchanges (PXs),
namely APX, Belpex and Powernext, who provide the IT
systems and run the common coupling algorithm, and, the
TSOs, namely RTE, Elia and TenneT, who calculate cross
border capacities, set up physical exchanges, share congestion
revenues and pay the market coupling service fee that is
determined locally. Regulatory oversight remains with the
national regulators and/or is subject to national legislation.
A detailed description of the TLC algorithm can be found
on the Web sites of the above PXs (e.g. [2]). Basically, it
consists of each market participant bidding in the day-ahead
market of the area where it is physically located, using the
rules and IT tools of the corresponding PX. These (sell or
purchase) bids are used by the PXs to construct the net export
curve of their markets, i.e. the difference between total sales
and total purchases of this market as a function of the Market
2Clearing Price (MCP). These curves are assembled in the
central coordination module so that markets with the highest
MCPs import electricity from markets with the lowest MCPs.
In the absence of congestion, the result is an import/export
pattern between markets in such volumes that the three local
MCPs become equal. Otherwise, import/export is settled up
to the ATCs and the markets end up with different prices.
This mechanism enables local markets participants to “see” a
larger liquidity, not limited to their area, within the limits of
the cross-border capacities of course.
The extension of TLC to the five countries of the Central
Western Europe (CWE) region has been announced for 2010.
This involves Germany and Luxemburg in addition to the three
TLC countries. A more sophisticated algorithm is envisaged
[7], although it retains the ideas that a market participant
interacts only with the PX of its area, while some central
calculations take care of energy being exported from low to
high price areas, within the limits of transfer capacity. First,
an ATC-based modeling of the network constraints will be
used, but it is planned to switch soon to a more precise flow-
based network model, in which critical branches (tie- and some
internal lines) will be defined by the CWE TSOs. For the time
being, the above market coupling mechanisms apply to day-
ahead procedures only. Steps are also taken towards opening
intra-day and real-time markets to foreign players [8].
The above outlined trilateral, and soon pentalateral, ini-
tiative couples the markets of the involved PXs. It should
be noted, however, that these PXs do not involve but a
fraction of the spot energy trade in Europe, where trading
arrangements are mainly bilateral. Most of the wholesale trade
is in the Over-The-Counter markets, often supplemented with
day-ahead auction trade organized by the national PXs [9].
The advantage of having the PXs organizing these auctions is
that they use simple rules to settle contracts at a point of time
where it is not worth getting into time consuming negotiations.
Power Exchanges are also counter-party for all transactions so
that trade is anonymous and traders do not have to worry
about counter-party risk. However, it could also be argued
that PXs are not strictly necessary market components [9].
Still, most European countries have a PX often as a result of
private initiatives. The PXs often do not have to take network
constraints into account at all, or they do only partly.
Compared to Europe, the North American wholesale mar-
kets appear more weakly linked, if at all. As considered in [9],
[10], it may be more difficult to couple these markets because
they apply a different implementation of nodal pricing, making
it practically difficult to harmonize the handling of network
constraints; even more if the latter is already fine-tuned, which
is less the case in Europe. There is, however, a common market
initiative between MISO and PJM who are working towards
the development of complementing system operations and
one robust, non-discriminatory wholesale electricity market to
meet the needs of all customers and stakeholders [11].
B. Scope of the paper
Before going into details, it is appropriate to formalize the
framework of the proposed approach, since there are various
electricity market implementations. We call System Operator
(SO) the entity responsible for operating the transmission sys-
tem of a particular area, while we call Transaction Scheduler
(TS) every entity responsible for settling transactions between
producers and consumers. For instance, a PX is a TS, but
other entities also fit the description, such as a broker who
settles bilateral or multilateral transactions. The SO is typically
a TS when dealing with real-time operation (balancing market,
generation re-dispatch, etc.).
Usually, there exists one PX (or none) per area, but in
principle nothing prevents several PXs from co-existing and
competing within an area. On the other hand, a PX can extend
its activities over more than one area. This is going to happen
in a near future with the merging of Powernext and EEX
(French and German PXs, respectively).
This paper investigates whether the constraint that a whole-
sale market participant should be part of a particular spot
market, defined by its geographic location, could be relaxed.
Thus, the presented approach assumes that every market
participant is allowed to bid in whatever market (represented
by a TS), irrespective of where it is located. More generally,
the paper proposes a framework and an algorithm to let market
actors use the grid in a coordinated way to perform commerce
of electrical energy without them being constrained to do so
via a TS covering only their geographic location.
Clearly, the idea that any market participant may place its
bids in the market of any TS operating in the interconnection
would result in the appearance of “overlapping markets” and
would make inter-area congestion management even more
important. The development of a coordinating framework is
thus required. This framework should enable free spot trade
of electricity. The TSs should be able to compete freely first
to attract market participants interested in settling transactions
and second to obtain transmission capacity in order to support
these transactions.
Furthermore, this work is based on the assumption that the
SOs of an interconnection are willing to co-operate in the
setting up of a common model of the grid and to delegate part
of the congestion management tasks to a central coordinating
entity. These assumptions seem acceptable and go with the
present trend, at least in Europe [12].
The proposed approach offers a decentralized way of co-
ordinating multilateral transactions. In this spirit, Ref. [13]
proposes a new operating paradigm in which the decision
mechanisms regarding economics and reliability (security) of
system operation are separated. In [14], the author proposes
two decentralized procedures in which each Regional Trans-
mission Organization (RTO) administers its energy market and
also acts as a transmission coordinator to achieve feasible and
efficient use of congested transmission by all markets in the
interconnection. Participants in any RTO market are allowed to
schedule transactions into, out of, or across any RTO control
areas. The resulting overlapping markets are modeled, while,
since when transmission capacity is limited markets compete
for the use of the limited transmission paths, two methods for
allocating this capacity are proposed. Closely related is also
the work in [15], which proposes a decentralized model for
dc load flow based congestion management for the forward
3markets via optimal resource allocation.
The approach developed in the present paper considers the
following two prerequisites:
1) Transparency of the grid data: SOs are responsible for
constructing a common model of the grid and make
it available to all participants. In this way everybody
will be able to check that the coordinating computations
made by the SOs are fair.
2) Confidentiality of each market data and procedures: the
TSs should not be asked to provide any intermediate
information of their market clearing procedures. They
should only announce their final schedules and prices.
The paper is organized as follows. The problem is stated in
Section II, which points out energy and transmission allocation
issues, and outlines the proposed approaches. In Section III
the procedure is presented in detail, while its features are
highlighted in Sections IV and V using illustrative examples.
Additional aspects are discussed in Section VI, while the paper
ends with a conclusion in Section VII.
II. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM AND OUTLINE OF THE
APPROACH
A. Market clearing and transmission system modeling
Let M be the number of TSs. Each TS clears the market it
represents, using its own rules. The outcomes are scheduled
generation-load quantities together with the corresponding
prices offered to each generator or asked by each load.
Although the clearing may be implemented in various ways,
we formalize it as an optimization problem. For the m-th TS,
































where cmi (respectively bmj ) is the bid of generator i (con-
sumer j) in market m, pmgi (pmlj ) is the allocated quantity of
generator i (consumer j), pmax,mgi is the maximum power that
generator i is willing to produce for market m, and pmax,mlj
is the maximum power that load j is willing to consume.
Equation (2) expresses that each TS has a balanced schedule.









This is written in vector form as pm = pmg − pml where
vectors pmg and pml have zeros in the entries corresponding
to buses with respectively no generation and no load allocated
by the m-th TS.
The vector of net bus power injections is obtained as the











Once this vector is known, branch power flows can be com-
puted using a model of the entire network. In this paper a
DC model of the interconnection is used. This is a commonly
used model in market clearing problems and it is well suited
to the linear computations presented in the remaining of the
paper. It is assumed that the various SOs in the interconnection
assemble and share such a network model, which they use to
coordinate the overlapping markets simultaneous clearings.
Let B be the number of branches and N the number of
buses in the system. In order to assess the impact of the power
injection schedule on branch flows, we resort to well-known
Power Transfer Distribution Factors (PTDF). Let F klb be the
fraction of a transaction from bus k to bus l that flows over
branch b (k, l = 1, . . . , N ; b = 1, . . . , B). According to [5]:
F klb =
Xik −Xjk −Xil +Xjl
xb
(7)
where i and j are the terminal buses of the branch, xb its
reactance, Xik the entry in the i-th row and k-th column of
the N×N bus reactance matrix X, and similarly for the other
entries. Assuming that bus N is the slack bus, the N -th row
and the N -th column of X have all zero elements [16].
The effect of the power injection pk at bus k on the power
flow of branch b can be seen as the effect of a transaction
pk between bus k and the slack bus N . The power flowing




F kNb pk (8)
This is easily written in matrix form as :
f = S p (9)
where f is the vector of branch power flows and S is the B×N




b b = 1, . . . , B; k = 1, . . . , N (10)
The choice of the slack bus influences the elements of S. How-
ever, when assessing the contribution of the market schedules
to branch flows, formula (9) will be applied to the injection
vector p whose components sum up to zero, owing to (2),
(5) and (6). Therefore, the net power injection caused by the
m-th market at the slack bus is zero. Thus, the branch flows
computed in (9) do not depend on the choice of the slack bus
(losses being neglected in this approach).
As long as there is enough reactive compensation to keep
voltage magnitudes constant at all buses, PTDFs have been
shown to remain practically unchanged as the pattern of
injections changes the loading of branches [17], [18], [19].
B. Emerging issues
Clearing the above mentioned overlapping markets without
any concern for the grid flows is very likely to end up in
branch overloads. The problem is not solved even if, following
the idea proposed in [20], TSs are asked to include in their
clearing problems (1-4) branch flow constraints of the type:





) ≤ fmax (11)
4where m− denotes all TS markets but the m-th one. Indeed,
this constraint means that a TS will come up with a schedule
that does not cause branch limit violation, given the last
schedule announced by the other TSs. However, since the
other TSs are clearing their own markets at the same time,
the combined schedule p may quite well lead to overloads.
The branch flow limits cannot be enforced by acting on
each market irrespective of what the other markets are doing;
instead, a coordinated congestion management is required.
Another issue has to do with the risk for the final schedule
to be far from what could be reached by optimizing the whole
system as a single market. The reason is that some attractive
market participants (e.g. cheap generators), having placed their
bids in a market, may be excluded when the latter is cleared,
and thus remain inactive while they could still be used by
another TS to reach a better schedule. One could argue that
such a case should not persist in the long term, because market
participants will “find their place”. However, the problem will
definitely appear in the short term. Hence, a mechanism should
allow efficient shifting of participants between the various TS
markets.
C. Outline of the proposed approach
We outline hereafter the solutions further developed in this
paper to deal with the above two issues.
Regarding the congestion management issue, the proposed
approach consists in sharing between the TSs the capacity of
the most used branches so that the m-th TS, when clearing
its market, would obey reduced flow limits fmax,mov , where the
lowerscript ov denotes the set of overloaded branches. The





ov , and are
iteratively adjusted to the schedules announced by the TSs.
Regarding the issue of attractive participants staying in-
active, the proposed solution consists in allowing market
participants to place their bids in more than one market
simultaneously. After the market clearings, the participant
should be allocated to the TS from which it received the best
offer (the highest price to be paid if it is a generator, or the
lowest price to pay if it is a consumer). Price is assumed to be
the criterion used to eventually select which TS a particular
participant will be assigned to.
Both treatments suggest the presence of a coordinating
entity. As to the congestion management issue, the coordinator
will iteratively communicate to the TSs their corresponding
reduced branch limits, which it will compute based on an
agreed policy. As for the market participant allocation, the
coordinator will check the prices offered by the TSs and
announce the generation/load quantities finally allocated to
each TS.
This coordinator may result from the joint efforts of the
involved SOs. Its role is to facilitate electricity trading, while
respecting the confidentiality of the TS data and the indepen-
dence of their procedures. In this respect, the only information
provided by the TSs to the central coordinator are their power
injection schedules and the corresponding prices offered to the
market participants.
III. THE PROPOSED ALGORITHM
Both coordinator tasks are now considered in detail, before
describing the whole algorithm.
A. Energy Allocation
An iterative procedure, referred to as “Energy allocation
loop”, is implemented by the coordinator to allow the pre-
viously mentioned simultaneous dispatching of the market
participants by all the TSs.
The procedure starts with the market participants placing
their bids, each consisting of a maximum quantity (correspond-
ing to available generation or to load asking to be served) and
one price per TS 1.
The TSs compete with each other trying to allocate in their
final dispatch the most interesting participants. Thus, after
having cleared its market, the m-th TS communicates to the
coordinator its demanded bus generation vector pm,demg and
consumption vector pm,deml , together with the corresponding
price vectors pimg and piml .
For a given generator i, if the total power demanded




≤ pmaxgi , that power is simply allocated to the
various TSs as they requested. Otherwise, there is a conflict,
and the role of the coordinator is to take care that the generator
is finally dispatched at the most profitable possible prices. To
this purpose, the coordinator allocates the power to one or
several of the involved TSs by decreasing order of offered
price. In case several TSs compete for the same generator
with equal offered prices, the available power is shared in
proportion with the requested quantities.
Hence, generally, some TSs will be left with power imbal-
ances, and the markets have to be cleared again. In order the
power just allocated to a TS not to be available to the others,
the coordinator communicates reduced bounds pmax,mgi to the
latter TSs.
Thus, the TSs come up with new demanded quantities and
offered prices. At this stage, the coordinator repeats the above
procedure, with the following two additional rules:
1) what was previously allocated to a TS and is still
requested remains with that TS;
2) what was previously allocated to a TS and is not
requested any longer is made right away available to
the other TSs.
These iterative adjustments lead to a gradual allocation of all
demanded generations. Loads are handled in a similar way,
but with the allocation performed by increasing order of prices
requested by the TSs in order to serve them.
The procedure terminates when each market is balanced, no
TS has incentive to further improve its schedule by dispatching
available generation or load, and no conflict is left for any
resource.
Note that no market participant is obliged to participate in
the Energy allocation procedure. Indeed, a market participant
may prefer to place its bid directly in a TS market because
1why market participants could bid differently to different TSs will be
discussed in the sequel
5of a beneficial arrangement made with this TS or because it
believes the announcement of the clearing price by the TS
would unveil its bid. Furthermore, no TS is obliged to accept
such bids. However, a TS may be willing to receive bids from
the above described Energy allocation procedure owing to the
risk of being left without enough participants interested in
placing their bids in its market. Thus, what has been described
refers to participants and TSs who choose to take advantage
of the higher liquidity offered by the proposed mechanism.
Note also that different markets may impose different
obligations or offer different benefits to their participants,
which can make the prices that a participant receives from
the various TSs for the same amount of energy not directly
comparable with each other. This will be generally reflected
on the individual price a market participant offers to each TS
in its bid. Additionally, a predefined correction term can be
applied when prices are compared by the central coordinator.
This is easily incorporated in the presented procedure. Further
discussion of this issue can be found in [21].
B. Transmission allocation
At the end of the Energy allocation procedure described
above, the bus injection vector defined in (6) is available.
Note that in general this vector also includes power injections
that result from a bilateral agreement between parties, and
hence have not been determined iteratively as described in the
previous section.
The corresponding branch flows can be computed. If no
limit is violated, the TS schedules can be approved. Other-
wise, congestions are managed through an iterative procedure,
referred to as “Transmission allocation loop”, as detailed
hereafter.
Assume that the power flow fb in the b-th branch (b =





b > 0 (12)








where sb is the b-th row of the S matrix and pmo is the schedule
of the m-th TS, obtained as described in the previous section.
It turns out that sbpmo is the participation of the m-th TS in
the b-th branch flow. Obviously, all TS participations add up
to the actual branch flow fb.
From there on, the m-th TS is required to change its
schedule from pmo to a new value pm so that its contribution to









with the sum of all ∆fm
−
values being equal to the branch




























and it will be decreased below or at its limit.





b < 0 (17)
the m-th TS is required to change its schedule so that its
contribution to the branch flow fb is increased by at least a
specified amount ∆fm+ :
sb(p
m − pmo ) ≥ ∆f
m
+ (18)











which leads to bringing the power flow above or at its limit.
Thus, each TS is required to incorporate the constraints (14)
and (18) into its market clearing problem (1-4). In fact, (14)








where the left-hand side represents the flow produced in
branch b by the schedule of the m-th TS, and the right-hand
side can be interpreted as a reduced capacity allocated to that
TS. A similar comment applies to (18).
As can be seen, the overload correction is shared among
the various TSs and, unlike (11), the constraint handled by
the m-th TS involves its own control variable pm only.




and ∆fm+ : The choice of ∆fm− and
∆fm+ by the coordinator dictates the way transmission capacity
will be eventually allocated to the TSs. As discussed in the
Introduction, an implicit auction approach, in which limited
transmission capacity is allocated in the course of clearing
the (multiple) markets, is chosen to deal with congestion
management.
As mentioned in Section II-C, only non commercially-
sensitive information, such as the cleared schedules from TSs,
should be communicated between involved parties. In this
context, it is proposed to allocate transmission capacity to TSs
in proportion to their respective utilizations of the congested
branches.
Coming back to the overloaded branch b, this choice
suggests that the constraint (20), reflecting the share of the










The above equation is equivalent, as can be shown by using





























Equation (21) suggests that the more a TS is using a



















Fig. 1. Example of counterflow situation
This goes towards increasing efficiency: the more a TS uses a
branch, the more this is likely to be valuable for its schedule.
On the other hand, (21) can be rewritten as
sb(p








which shows that the more a TS participates in a congestion,
the more it has to participate in its alleviation. This meets the
objective of fairness and practical acceptability of the policy:
the larger the responsibility of a TS in a flow, the larger the
correction requested from this TS.
These two interpretations of (21) may look contradictory
at a first glance but are mathematically equivalent owing to
the choice of proportionality. The allocation rule is further
discussed in Section VI-B.
2) Counterflow situations: It may happen that the schedule
of a TS creates a counterflow in an overloaded branch. This
situation is depicted in Fig. 1, which refers to a case with three
TSs. In the situation shown, the branch is overloaded but the
contribution sbp1o of the first TS is in the opposite direction
with respect to the power flow fob . Clearly, this TS reduces
the overload caused by the other two TSs.
It would not be fair to impose a congestion management
constraint to a TS that contributes with such a counterflow,
since the latter in fact reduces the overload created by the other
TS schedules. On the contrary, the counterflow leaves more
room for the transactions of the other TSs, which is good from
the market viewpoint. Hence, when allocating the available
capacities among TSs, it is reasonable to let unconstrained the
TSs that cause counterflows and share the effort among the
other TSs. To this purpose, for a branch with an upper limit
violation (12) it suffices to use (14) with the sums extending
only over the schedules with positive contributions sbpmo .
Similarly, for a branch with a lower limit violation (17), only
the schedules with a negative contribution are considered when
using (18).
As will be explained in Section III-C, iterations are per-
formed between market clearings by the TSs, on one hand,
and Transmission allocation by the coordinator, on the other
hand. If the TS producing the counterflow is not requested to
change its schedule, there is no reason for that TS to depart
from its optimum, and it will keep on contributing with the
same counterflow. On the other hand, if the handling of another
branch overload requires the TS to change its schedule, it may
happen that its counterflow is decreased. In this case, at the
next iteration, the branch will still be overloaded and through












































Fig. 2. Flowchart of the iterative Energy and Transmission allocations
to contribute more towards its alleviation. Obviously, if a TS
stops counterflowing, it enters the congestion management
procedure as the other TSs.
3) Handling multiple congestions: After a branch overload
has been handled as described above, it should be prevented
from taking place again in subsequent iterations, for instance
when other branch overloads are handled. To this purpose,
the inequality constraints (14, 18) stemming from previous
congestion managements should remain in effect when dealing
with new congestions2. Of course, for the formerly congested
branches, the constraints will allow using the remaining part
of the available capacity (i.e. ∆fm
−
and ∆fm+ are negative for
such branches).
C. Overall procedure for Energy and Transmission allocations
As already mentioned, in the general case, iterations need to
be performed between the Energy and Transmission allocation
procedures. The overall procedure is outlined in Fig. 2.
The procedure starts with each TS clearing its market
according to its own procedures and rules. The resulting
demanded (not approved yet) schedules and corresponding
offered prices are communicated to the coordinator.
The latter first deals with Energy allocation. When the
received schedules are in conflict, resources are allocated
as explained in Section III-A and new constraints regarding
the availability of these resources are communicated to the
TSs, which clear again their markets. The procedure, depicted
with dashed line in Fig. 2 is repeated until the coordinator
eventually receives schedules with no availability conflict; the
latter are used in the Transmission allocation block.
This block performs the computations presented in section
III-B and, in case of congestions, sends back the constraints
2again, note that constraints of the type (11) cannot be used because the
various TSs clear their markets simultaneously
7(14, 18) to the TSs for inclusion in their market clearing. This
makes up an outer loop, shown with heavy line in Fig. 2.
Before doing so, a convergence test is performed on all
branches that have been involved in constraints (14, 18). If
any power flow differs from the value at the previous iteration
by more than a tolerance ǫ, the algorithm proceeds with a new
Energy allocation loop; otherwise the procedure is completed.
One could think of stopping the iterations as soon as the
schedules resulting from the M simultaneous market clearings
do not lead to any new branch overload. The reason for not
doing so can be seen from the following counterexample. Due
to the flow it causes in branch b, the constraint sb(pm−pmo ) ≤
−∆fm
−
is imposed to the m-th TS, and sb(pk−pko) ≤ −∆fk−
to the k-th TS. Assume furthermore that when clearing its
market, the k-th TS comes up with a schedule pknew such
that its participation to the b-th power flow is lower than
expected, i.e. sb(pknew − pko) < −∆fk− (which may happen
if this TS has to satisfy other constraints as well). Then, some
transmission capacity is left unused. The procedure should
not stop but leave the m-th TS the opportunity to exploit
this margin, for the sake of economic efficiency. However,
if needed due to limited remaining time, the procedure could
stop at an intermediate, already available, feasible schedule.
D. Information flow during the execution of the algorithm
It is appropriate to summarize the information disclosed and
communicated between parties.
Each market participant places its bid to a number of TSs
(generally, different per TS). This information is given only
to the TS receiving the bid. At no point of the procedure it is
revealed to any other entity.
Every time the TSs simultaneously clear their markets, they
announce to the coordinator their preferred schedules and the
prices they offer to the market participants. This information is
made available only to the coordinator during the procedure,
but it could be disclosed at the end so that interested parties
can check that the coordinator has acted according to the rules.
The coordinator communicates to the TSs linear constraints
relating their net bus power injections with sought changes in
branch flows. The model used by the coordinator to compute
those flows is in principle available to all market participants,
allowing them to check that they have been properly treated
during the execution of the algorithm.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS ON A 15-BUS TEST SYSTEM
A. Test system
For clarity, we illustrate the features of the proposed ap-
proach on a problem where: (i) the loads are considered
fixed, i.e. only the generators are bidding, and (ii) each of
the involved TSs serves the load of an area. Note that the
method is generally able to handle situations where each TS
serves loads dispersed throughout the whole system, or some
loads place their bids simultaneously to more than one TSs.
Thus, each TS dispatches generation, located anywhere in
the interconnection, so as to satisfy the load located in its area.
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0 ) ≥ ∆f
m
+ b = 1, . . . (28)
where all symbols have been previously defined, and the last
two constraints stem from the coordinator.
The 3-area 15-bus system shown in Fig. 3 is used. It consists
of three 5-bus areas, each of them serving 600 MW of load.
The three areas are identical as regards the distribution of loads
and the location and capacity of generators. However, they
differ by the generator bids, which are the cheapest in area A
and the most expensive in area C. Each generator is assumed
to make the same bid to all three TSs (i.e. cAi = cBi = cCi ).
B. Examples of iterations
In order to provide insight on how the algorithm performs,
we present hereafter the results obtained at the first three
iterations of the procedure, followed by those of the final
generation schedule.
At the initial point, all TSs are allowed to compete for all
generators without any other constraint than (25) and (26),
with pmax,mgi = p
max
gi
, ∀m. Obviously, this leads to all of
them simultaneously demanding the cheapest generations, i.e.
all TSs ask for 300 MW from gA2 and 300 MW from gA1.
Hence, the Energy allocation procedure merely divides the
available generation in equal parts, and these constraints are
sent back to the TSs for them to perform new market clearings.
This step is repeated, as shown by the dashed line in Fig. 2,
until no two TSs compete for the same power generation. This
yields the situation detailed in Table I. For each generator,
Columns 1 and 2 give its name and bid (e/MWh), Columns
3 to 5 show the power allocated to each TS, Column 6 gives
its total allocated generation (i.e. the sum of Columns 3 to 5),
while Column 7 shows its maximum production capacity.
At this stage, the coordinator can determine the resulting
flows and check the corresponding limits. The results for the
overloaded branches are given in Table II. Columns 2 to 4
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ITERATION 1: GENERATION ALLOCATED TO EACH TS (IN MW)









gA1 5 150 150 150 450 450
gA2 4 100 100 100 300 300
gA4 15 0 0 0 0 600
gA5 8 150 150 150 450 450
gB1 11 100 100 100 300 450
gB2 10 100 100 100 300 300
gB4 20 0 0 0 0 600
gB5 18 0 0 0 0 450
gC1 30 0 0 0 0 450
gC2 30 0 0 0 0 300
gC4 40 0 0 0 0 600
gC5 35 0 0 0 0 450
show the participation of each TS to each branch flow, while
Columns 5 and 6 give respectively the branch flow and its
limit. The last three columns of the table show by how much
each TS will be requested to change each power flow in its next
market clearing, according to Eq. (22). Adding together the
various ∆fm
−
values of a branch yields the overload fb−fmaxb
that has to be corrected.
It is noteworthy that TS A is obliged to decrease the flows
on branches A1A3 and A2A3 by less than the other two TSs,
even if all three are allocated the same power from generators
gA1 and gA2. This is due to the fact that TS A serves some
loads on buses A1 and A2, which makes it less responsible
for the flows on those two branches.
Finally, the dash in the last row of Table II means that
TS A is not requested to change its contribution to the
branch flow A4C4 because it is counterflowing, as explained
in Section III-B2. Indeed, TS A has a negative contribution of
-42 MW to the final branch flow of 408 MW. The necessary
power flow decrease by 408-200 = 208 MW is assigned to the
other two TSs, in proportion to their participation.
TABLE II
ITERATION 1: POWER FLOWS AND REQUESTED CORRECTIONS (IN MW)







A1A3 32 133 133 298 150 16 66 66
A2A3 18 117 117 252 150 8 47 47
B1B3 100 0 100 200 150 25 0 25
B2B3 100 0 100 200 150 25 0 25
A4C4 -42 125 325 408 200 - 58 150
This completes the first execution of the Transmission
allocation loop shown with solid line in Fig. 2. At this
point the TSs perform new market clearings incorporating the
constraints (27, 28). The corresponding demanded generations
are shown in Columns 3 to 5 of Table III.
What makes the TSs adjust their schedules with respect
to the values in Table I is the addition of the constraints
dealing with the overloaded branches. For instance, TS C is
obliged to abandon most of the power it planned to obtain
from generators located in system A, in order to decrease by
150 MW the flow it causes on the tie-line A4C4 (see Table II).
When the second iteration starts, no TS can use the power
allocated to another TS at the first iteration. For example, TS
A can only resort to 150 MW from generator gA5 since the
remaining 300 MW were already allocated to TSs B and C
TABLE III
ITERATION 2: GENERATION SCHEDULE (IN MW) AFTER FIRST ITERATION
OF THE ENERGY ALLOCATION LOOP
Gen cg demanded by allocated to ptotalg
TS A TS B TS C TS A TS B TS C
gA1 5 125 63 0 125 63 0 188
gA2 4 100 73 74 100 73 74 247
gA4 15 75 0 0 75 0 0 75
gA5 8 150 110 0 150 110 0 260
gB1 11 75 100 0 75 100 0 175
gB2 10 75 100 100 75 100 100 275
gB4 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
gB5 18 0 154 426 0 119 331 450
gC1 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
gC2 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
gC4 40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
gC5 35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(see Table I). More precisely, TS A can either keep from gA5
those 150 MW already allocated to it or make it partly or
fully available to the other TSs, depending upon the outcome
of its new market clearing. Indeed, Table III shows that TS A
is obliged to release part of the powers allocated to it from
gA1, gB1 and gB2, in order to meet the constraints stemming
from branches A1A3, A2A3, B1B3 and B2B3. It should be
noted how the constraint on the tie-line A4C4 has affected
the market clearing solutions of TS B and even more TS C,
both obliged to replace cheap generation in area A by more
expensive in area B.
For generator gB5, the total demanded generation exceeds
its capacity (see highlighted values in the table). According
to the rule discussed in Section III-A, the TS making the best
bid has priority. A marginal clearing price mechanism has been
assumed for all three TSs. Hence, the price offered by each TS
is the bid of the most expensive generator in its dispatch. In
this particular case, it happens that both TS B and TS C (TS
A does not ask any power from gB5) offer the same price of
18 e/MWh. Hence, according to the default rule suggested in
Section III-A, the remaining capacity (in this case the whole
450 MW available) is allocated to each TS proportionally to
what it asks. Columns 6 to 8 in Table III show the quantities
allocated as a result of the above decisions.
Since there was one generator with demand higher than
capacity, another execution of the Energy allocation loop is
performed, involving new market clearings. In the latter, the
congestion management constraints remain unchanged, but the
pmax,mgi bounds in (26) have been updated. For instance, TS
A now sees 450 - 110 = 340 MW available from gA5, and
450 - 331 - 119 = 0 MW available from gB5. From the latter,
TS B and TS C see 119 MW and 331 MW respectively.
The resulting generation schedule is given in Table IV. As
can be seen, TS A has released most of the generation it had
in area B in order to dispatch the less expensive that is now
available in area A (gA5). As there is no conflict between
demanded and available quantities, the algorithm proceeds
with the Transmission allocation.
The new power flow corrections are detailed in Table V,
which illustrates other features of the proposed method.
First, one can see that all the previously overloaded branches
have been brought back within limits, except tie-line A4C4.
The reason is that not all TSs have participated in alleviating
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ITERATION 2: GENERATION ALLOCATED TO EACH TS (IN MW)









gA1 5 123 63 0 186 450
gA2 4 103 73 107 283 300
gA4 15 0 0 0 0 600
gA5 8 340 110 0 450 450
gB1 11 0 100 7 107 450
gB2 10 33 100 111 244 300
gB4 20 0 34 0 34 600
gB5 18 0 119 331 450 450
gC1 30 0 0 0 0 450
gC2 30 0 0 0 0 300
gC4 40 0 0 0 0 600
gC5 35 0 0 43 43 450
TABLE V
ITERATION 2: POWER FLOWS AND REQUESTED CORRECTIONS (IN MW)







A1A3 16 67 38 121 150 -4 -16 -9
A2A3 10 70 70 150 150 0 0 0
B1B3 11 0 44 55 150 -20 0 -75
B2B3 21 0 75 96 150 -12 0 -42
A4C4 18 67 175 260 200 5 15 40
B4C3 -18 -67 382 297 200 - - 97
the congestion of that branch. Indeed, after the first iteration,
the necessary A4C4 flow decrease of 208 MW was assigned to
TS B and C, while TS A was left unconstrained owing to the
counterflow it was creating. As a matter of fact, TS B and TS
C have decreased their contribution by the expected 208 MW
amount, but the new market clearing of TS A contributes to
the branch flow with 18 MW instead of the previous -42 MW.
This change is driven by the new constraints imposed to TS
A. Therefore, the line remains overloaded by 18 - (-42) =
60 MW, as shown in Table V. Hence, new corrections are
going to be imposed, in which TS A will participate since it
does no longer counterflow.
Next, it should be pointed out that for branches that were
previously overloaded but are not anymore (namely, A1A3,
B1B3 and B2B3) the remaining capacity is now shared among
the TSs in proportion to their contributions to the flows. This
yields the negative values of ∆fm
−
shown in the table.
Finally, a new branch (B4C3) gets overloaded and hence
enters the set of constraints.
A new market clearing with these updated branch flow
constraints yield the generation schedule shown in Table VI.
C. Features of the final generation schedule
The algorithm proceeds similarly until the congested branch
flows differ by less than ǫ =2 MW from their values at the
previous iteration. This takes place after 5 iterations and yields
the final values presented in Table VII (Columns 3 to 6).
Figure 4 shows the evolution of four of the congested branch
flows through the successive iterations. The horizontal line
corresponds to the branch flow limit.
For comparison purposes, a single market clearing has been
considered. It consists in solving a single optimization for the
whole system, with the objective of minimizing the total cost
(i.e. maximizing total social welfare) while respecting branch
flow limits. The resulting generations psnglgi are provided
TABLE VI
ITERATION 3: GENERATION ALLOCATED TO EACH TS (IN MW)









gA1 5 132 98 0 230 450
gA2 4 99 54 89 242 300
gA4 15 0 0 0 0 600
gA5 8 326 68 0 394 450
gB1 11 10 100 23 133 450
gB2 10 33 100 167 300 300
gB4 20 0 0 0 0 600
gB5 18 0 179 141 320 450
gC1 30 0 0 0 0 450
gC2 30 0 0 0 0 300
gC4 40 0 0 0 0 600
gC5 35 0 0 181 181 450
TABLE VII
FINAL GENERATION ALLOCATION (IN MW)











gA1 5 136 113 0 249 250 450
gA2 4 98 56 96 250 250 300
gA4 15 0 0 0 0 0 600
gA5 8 324 58 0 382 300 450
gB1 11 9 100 48 157 250 450
gB2 10 33 100 167 300 250 300
gB4 20 0 0 0 0 0 600
gB5 18 0 173 89 262 300 450
gC1 30 0 0 0 0 0 450
gC2 30 0 0 0 0 200 300
gC4 40 0 0 0 0 0 600


















Fig. 4. Evolution of power flows with iterations: branch A1A3 is shown
with +, A2A3 with ◦, B1B3 with , B4C3 with ×






is given in Table VIII. As regards the
proposed method, Columns 2 to 4 in the same table show the
generation costs relative to the three TS final schedules, and









), which corresponds to the social welfare of
the entire system, obtained by the proposed method.
One can notice that with the proposed method TS A
managed to allocate the cheapest schedule while TS C ended
up with the most expensive one. This is due to the limited
capacities of the three tie-lines A4C4, A3B3 and B4C3 and to
the fact that, during the execution of the procedure, the TSs
have been obliged to reschedule their generations in order to
unload congested branches. TS C has been assigned most of
the effort to alleviate the overloads of these tie-lines during
the execution of the algorithm (see Tables II, V).
At the final allocation no TS can further decrease its cost, by
rescheduling its already allocated generation or replacing some
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TABLE VIII
FINAL GENERATION COSTS (IN e/H)
Csngl CA CB CC Ctot
21300 4093 6467 11184 21743
of it with some of the remaining available one, without causing
the violation of one or more constraints. This is why some
cheaper generation remains not fully exploited. For instance,
TS C cannot resort to gC1 or gC2 instead of gC5 because
shifting some generation from gC5 to gC1, for example, would
cause the overload of one or more branches. More generally,
there is no other combination involving all the generators’
available quantities (i.e. not already allocated to TSs A and B)
that results in a cost for TS C lower than 11184 e/h. There
is no concern, though; TS C requested gC5 instead of gC1 or
gC2 during the execution of the algorithm, since this allowed
to allocate more interesting cheap generation outside area C.
Expectedly, the single system-wide optimization yields a
schedule with lower total cost than the proposed algorithm.
This suggests that arrangements could be made between the
TSs, economically profitable for all of them, such that more
expensive generation is released in favor for some cheaper.
It is not within the scope of this paper to simulate such
arrangements but it is not incompatible with the proposed
approach to let the TSs communicate with each other and
exchange allocated generation quantities while clearing their
markets. Of course, these inter-TS arrangements should remain
consistent with the congestion alleviation obligations as well
as the already allocated quantities and prices resulting from
the coordinator’s computations.
The cost of the system-wide optimal solution (21300 e/h)
is 2 % lower than the total cost obtained by the proposed
algorithm (21743 e/h). Let us emphasize, however, that the
proposed algorithm is not aimed at minimizing the total
operating cost; it should not be confused with algorithms for
optimizing a single objective in a distributed manner [22], [23].
However, the fact that it yields an overall cost very close to
the one obtained when handling the whole system as a single
market appears to be an attractive feature. This issue is further
discussed in Section VI-C.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS ON IEEE RTS-96 TEST SYSTEM
The algorithm was also tested on the IEEE Three-Area Reli-
ability Test System - 1996 documented in [24]. This somewhat
larger system was obtained by triplicating the One Area RTS-
96 system, and consists of three topologically identical 24-
bus systems connected with 5 tie-lines. In order to create
different price areas, the marginal costs of generators have
been modified with respect to [24] so that every generator in
area 2 is twice as expensive as its counterpart in area 1, while
the generators in area 3 are made three times as expensive
as those in area 1. Note that in spite of these price increases,
area 3 still includes attractive generators compared to the other
areas. Again, it was assumed that load demand is inelastic,
each TS serves the loads of one area resorting to any generator,
and a marginal clearing pricing mechanism is used by every
TS. The resulting scenario is interesting owing to the involved
generation (re-)allocation, as shown hereafter.
TABLE IX
IEEE RTS-96 SYSTEM; INTERMEDIATE RESULTS
outer loop inner loop cost (in e/h)
iter. count iterations of TS 1 of TS 2 of TS 3 total
1 11 10457.5 10457.5 10457.5 31372.5
2 1 10457.5 10457.5 10589.0 31504.0
3 3 10374.7 10374.7 10587.4 31336.8
4 1 10374.7 10374.7 10814.4 31563.8
5 4 10280.4 10280.4 10811.7 31372.5
6 1 10280.4 10280.4 11058.6 31619.4
7 4 10158.2 10158.2 11056.2 31372.6
8 5 9994.0 10120.0 11297.3 31411.3
9 1 9995.3 10120.9 11410.1 31526.3
10 2 9957.4 10091.3 11402.9 31451.6
11 1 9957.5 10091.6 11417.5 31466.6
It took 11 iterations for the procedure to converge with a
tolerance ǫ = 2 MW. Intermediate results are presented in
Table IX. Each row refers to results obtained after executing
the outer (Transmission allocation) loop, while the second
column gives the number of inner (Energy allocation) loop
executions. Columns 3 to 5 present the individual TS costs,
while Column 6 shows the sum of those three individual costs.
The overall procedure can be summarized as follows. At the
first iteration, network congestions are not handled yet and,
since equal loads have to be served by all TSs, the cheapest
generations are allocated in equal parts to each of them. This
explains the identical costs shown in the table. As a result, the
tie-lines of Area 3 are congested. Only TS 3 is responsible
for these overloads since the other two TSs contribute with
counterflows. Hence, TS 3 has to de-allocate generation in
Areas 1 and 2 and replace it by more expensive in Area 3. This
explains why only the cost of TS 3 increases at iteration 2. The
so released capacity is used by TS 1 and 2 at iteration 3, which
explains the corresponding cost decreases. This goes with a
decrease in the generation allocated to TS 1 and 2 in Area 3.
Therefore, the counterflows in the above mentioned tie-lines
somewhat decrease, which causes overload again. Hence, at
iteration 4, TS 3 has to further correct its schedule to keep the
tie-line power flows within limits. The situation is unchanged
until iteration 7 when TS 1 and 2 stop counterflowing, and
hence have to participate in the congestion alleviation Note
that, in case of limiting time, the algorithm could even stop
here as suggested at the end of Section III-C. From there
on, no further line is congested and no further power flow
contribution changes sign; the last iterations are devoted to
satisfying the convergence criterion.
As for the 15-bus system, a comparison was carried out
with a single market clearing for the whole system. The
corresponding cost was found to be 31456.8 e/h, which is to
be compared with the final total cost of 31466.6 e/h obtained
with the proposed procedure (see Table IX). Again, it is
noteworthy that the two costs are quite close to each other;
they differ by 0.031 % only.
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VI. DISCUSSION
A. Incorporating bilateral trades
It should be noted that the Energy allocation loop is optional
in the proposed procedure; it is the Transmission allocation
that enables the simultaneous use of the network for multiple
trades. For instance, the procedure can easily accommodate
bilateral trades scheduled in the spot markets 3.
A bilateral trade is nothing but a schedule submitted to the
coordinator by one of the sides of the trade (i.e. either the
producer or the consumer plays the role of the TS). Clearly,
in the Energy allocation loop the bilateral trades are always
allocated as they are announced. When the feasibility of the
overall schedule is checked in the Transmission allocation
loop, however, it may be possible that a TS scheduling a
bilateral trade is asked to decrease its flow contribution to one
or several overloaded lines. In this case, it will have to cut a
part of the trade. Of course, if later on during the execution
of the algorithm some of this transmission capacity is made
available, the TS could use it to satisfy as much of the intended
trade as possible.
B. On the choice of the congestion management policy
A possibly controversial choice in the proposed algorithm,
is the way the coordinator shares the use of the branches that
tend to get overloaded. Economic theory would suggest that,
in order to optimize the use of the whole system, each line
capacity should be shared according to the economic value it
has for each TS. More precisely, it was shown in [15] that at
the operating point where total social welfare is maximum, all
TSs equally value the use of any congested branch. Indeed, if
at least one branch b had a larger value for TS A than for TS
B, then the total social welfare could be further maximized
by decreasing the share of the branch capacity allocated to B
and increasing correspondingly the share allocated to A. This
in turn requires computing the sensitivity of the individual TS
social welfare (1) to the branch capacity assigned to that TS.
Clearly, in order the above sensitivities to be compared, they
must be communicated to a coordinator [14], [15].
First, it must be recalled that the method proposed in this
paper does not aim at maximizing the above total social wel-
fare but instead focuses on simultaneously optimizing multiple
overlapping markets (while making the best possible use of the
transmission system). Next, the proposed algorithm has been
built on the premise that no TS should be asked to provide
sensitive private information. In this respect, the choice of
relying on the TS participation in branch flows preserves
confidentiality, while it sounds reasonable, fair, and according
to the test results, economically efficient. Even more, due to
its simplicity, it is more transparent and could be more easily
accepted by market participants and TSs.
Even if this sensitivity information was asked from the
TSs, it might not be possible for the coordinator to check its
validity. A mechanism should be thought to motivate the TSs
to announce true sensitivity values. This can be done through
3Bilateral trades that have been scheduled in forward markets are not
involved in the proposed approach (although they are taken into account when
estimating the available transmission capacities).
TSs bidding (in explicit auctions) for individual branch trans-
mission capacity. This would be a step back towards separate
transmission and energy markets. Moreover, it may not be easy
for a TS to value the use of each branch individually, in the
presence of several congested branches, especially in meshed
systems. Indeed, these values are much interdependent; the
value of a branch for a TS would vary depending on the TS
expectation to allocate the use of other branches. This passes
the complications of the overlapping markets approach to the
responsibility of the TS.
Clearly, the best way for allocating transmission capacity
according to its real economic value for each TS (instead of
doing this according to the TS intention of use) would be to
have them revealing the bids that the market participants have
placed to them in order for the coordinator to run an optimiza-
tion problem and figure out the transmission lines economic
value per TS. This would be a step towards centralization of
the markets, while the proposed approach aims at allowing
co-existence of separate decentralized markets.
C. Comparison with centralized, fully integrated approach
The direction followed in this paper is that of a decentralized
approach for merging separate interconnected markets into a
single large one. An alternative is that the involved entities
(market participants, SOs, regulators and others) in the sepa-
rate areas-markets agree to overcome the administrative and
maybe political difficulties to merge into a single centrally
operated system. In this case, the new central authority could
clear the entire interconnection using an algorithm that collects
bids from all market participants and maximizes the social
welfare of the entire interconnection. Two objections may be
raised at this point.
First, the willingness of all involved parties to adhere to
such a central common operation may be argued. Indeed, an
individual area may not want to participate into an overall
social welfare maximization because this may lead to a lower
social welfare locally inside this area. A set of market partici-
pants won’t agree to be part of a central solution if making an
arrangement between themselves is more profitable for them.
Second, whether it is preferable to operate the market in
a centralized manner or coordinate multilateral trades, has
been extensively discussed. It is not the intention of this
paper to come up with a choice between the two, but it is
worth pointing out some pros and cons of each. In principle,
centralized operation mimics the old vertical organization,
with the market participants’ bids replacing their marginal
costs and benefits. Major advantages of this approach are: (a)
transmission network constraints are taken care of implicitly
when clearing the energy market and (b) experience shows
that it is less exposed to “gaming” by market participants.
Centralized market clearing results in nodal LMPs, that is all
market participants connected on the same bus pay or get paid
the same price.
The choice/need for centralization stems from the difficulty
to efficiently coordinate multilateral trades being simultane-
ously scheduled; it is not an objective by itself. On the








Fig. 5. Example illustrating the different shares of social welfare
market participants the option to buy and sell electric energy
in the terms they agree between themselves. However, given
the transmission network constraints that couple the different
transactions, it is more challenging to coordinate them in a
decentralized way.
The proposed decentralized scheme allows the participants
to directly trade electricity in the terms they wish. Different
markets could operate with different individual rules, while
competition should encourage the evolution of the TSs market
designs, products, software interfaces, efficiency of market
clearing algorithms etc.
The co-existence of different markets allows for different
ways of sharing the social welfare and for different pricing
mechanisms. A generator could sell part of its production at
a high price to consumers that value it a lot and another
part at a lower price to consumers who are not willing to
pay this much. With this price discrimination [25], neither
low-paying consumers are excluded from the market, nor are
cheap generators obliged to obtain low profit for energy sold
to consumers that value it a lot.
The above reasoning is better illustrated through the simple
example sketched in Fig. 5, where a high price area is
connected to a single-bus low price area through a 300-MW
transmission link. All generators of the high price area are
assumed to have a marginal cost (mc) greater than 10e/MWh
and all loads a marginal benefit (mb) greater than 10e/MWh
as well. There is cheap generation available (mc=4e/MWh) in
the low price area, but it cannot be fully utilized owing to the
transmission constraint. Additionally, there is some low-value
load (mb=6e/MWh) located in the low price area.
Let us first consider the case of a central market clearing
resulting in nodal LMPs. If the cheap generator bids its
marginal cost, it will be scheduled for a 400 MW production at
a price of 4e/MWh, which will result in a revenue of 1600e/h
and zero profit (it will be the marginal generator within the low
price area). The generator could anticipate that the load located
in the low price area is willing to pay more for energy and
thus it could bid a price of 6e/MWh. In this case the generator
will be again scheduled for a 400 MW production, but now at
the price of 6e/MWh resulting in a revenue of 2400e/h and
a profit of 800e/h. Furthermore, the cheap generator could
anticipate the costs and willingness to pay of the participants
located in the high price area and, thus, it could submit a
bid of 10e/MWh. In this case the low-value load will not be
served and the cheap generator will be scheduled to produce
300 MW at a price of 10e/MWh, resulting in a revenue of
3000e/h and a profit of 1400e/h. This behavior maximizes
the generator’s profit under the centralized LMP-based market
clearing. However, there remains some unserved load in the
low price area, that is willing to pay more for energy than
the marginal cost of a generator who is able to provide this
energy. Social welfare of (6-4)x100=200e/h is lost.
In the decentralized approach proposed in this paper, differ-
ent TSs could serve the high-value and the low-value load of
the example. The cheap generator can again bid its capacity
at 10e/MWh to the high-value load and make a revenue of
3000e/h. However, in this scheme, the generator can also
place a bid in the market of the TS that serves the low-value
load. The value of the generator’s bid price, between 4 and
6 e/MWh, will define how the extra welfare of 200e/h will
be shared between the generator and the load of the low price
area. For instance, the cheap generator could be scheduled a
100 MW production at 6e/MWh to serve the low-value load,
resulting in some extra 600e/h revenue.
As suggested, there is a welfare equal to
∑
i(prgi−mci)+∑
j(mbj − prlj) (with prgi and prlj the price paid to the
i-th generator and paid by the j-th load) that, depending on
the market clearing mechanism, is to be shared between the
participants. A part of this money should be withheld by the
TS who clears the market in order to cover its operational
costs. One can see that letting market participants the choice of
TS, introduces competition among TSs to clear their markets
as efficiently as possible.
To close the centralized vs. decentralized discussion, it must
be emphasized that a decentralized approach like the one
presented in this paper does not aim at maximizing total social
welfare in the short-term, unlike what typically a centralized
approach does. The former rather allows for free electricity
trade according to the market participants’ preferences. It is
in the longer-term that a decentralized approach may be more
beneficial than the centralized one, due to the market openness
and the innovation it promotes. In this respect, if the short-
term results of a decentralized approach are far worse than
those of the centralized one, this suggests that it is not worth
being considered, since its possible longer-term benefits will
not be expected to compensate for the short-term inefficient
use of the energy and transmission resources. On the other
hand, if a decentralized approach results in schedules with
total economic value close to the optimum obtained by the
centralized solution, this is a good indication that the approach
under examination may be a worthy one.
VII. CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVES
This paper has investigated the possibility of allowing
external actors to bid in whatever market of an interconnection,
thereby leading to co-existence of several overlapping markets.
The procedure is based on the following premises:
• the SOs put efforts together in order to come up with and
share a common network model as well as jointly operate
a central coordinator;
• the various TSs can resort to different market clearing
mechanisms;
• the coordination does not require the TSs to provide in-
formation that is either economically sensitive or difficult
to validate (such as Lagrange multipliers).
The proposed method is another step towards creating a
common electric energy marketplace in an interconnection,
13
where congestion is implicitly managed in an efficient way,
both from a social fairness viewpoint as well as from an
engineering one. As regards the common marketplace, the
proposed Energy allocation procedure allows different elec-
tricity markets to be coupled, thus offering more options to
participants and more liquidity to TSs. As for congestion
management, the proposed Transmission allocation procedure
offers a mechanism that is fair and easy to implement, while
leading to efficient use of the transmission network.
The approach has been thoroughly illustrated on small-scale
examples. Although they refer, for clarity, to a simplified situa-
tion (inelastic load, all TSs using the same pricing mechanism,
etc.), the approach can encompass more involved situations.
Admittedly, more testings are needed before considering the
proposed method for practical application. Ongoing work is in
progress on several issues such as: (a) incorporating complex
bid structures; (b) vulnerability to participants or TSs trying to
“game” the procedure; (c) link to existing transmission pricing
mechanisms and (d) possibility of reducing the number of
iterations, if prohibitive.
Regarding (c), it was assumed in this work that one or
several transmission pricing schemes are in effect throughout
the system. The latter are expected to be reflected in the prices
offered by the TSs or/and the market participants.
Regarding (d), it is recognized that with the current state
of the art the proposed iterative clearing methodology would
pose an important burden in the bidding-settling process and
would increase the transaction costs. However, as electricity
markets mature, the bidding process is expected to become
routine for generators and the motive for profit will drive them
to bid across multiple markets, given the relevant framework.
In addition, advances in online negotiation and electronic
trade using intelligent agents [26], [27] are likely to wipe out
the increased time requirements and transactions costs of the
proposed iterative scheme.
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